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1

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

:

Plaintiff / Appellee,
v.
:
JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G. HAVAS;
and P & F FOOD SERVICES,
Defendants / Appellants. -

Case No. 20100511-SC

:
:

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF / APPELLEE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court under
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. This matter is now on appeal for the third time. Before the first appeal, the
parties settled all issues other than whether the defendants were entitled to seek severance
damages for loss of view and loss of visibility. Defendants were paid the stipulated
amount and afinaljudgment was entered. Can the defendants now seek further severance
damages apart from for loss of view and visibility?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: UDOT raises this
issue as an alternative ground for affirmance. Accordingly, there is no district court
decision to be reviewed.
2. Did the jury instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury as to the
standard to be used in considering the damages the defendants suffered due to their partial
loss of view?
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: Defendants have
failed to show where in the record they preserved their objections to the jury instructions.
"Whether a trial court properly instructed the jury is a question of law, which we review
for correctness. In reviewing a jury instruction, we consider the challenged instruction in
context." Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10,^fl6, 977 P.2d 474
(citations omitted) (if the jury instructions as a whole fairly instruct the jury, it is not
reversible error if one instruction, standing aloile, is not as accurate as it might have
been).
3. Defendants filed a motion in limine asking the district court to strike portions of
an appraisal report because it partially relied on hearsay evidence. Have the defendants
failed to meet their burden to show that the district court's denial of their motion in limine
was prejudicial and not harmless?
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is
unique to the appeal and does not involve the review of a district court decision.
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4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it permitted the use of J. Philip
Cook's appraisal report which relied, in part, on hearsay evidence?
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was
raised below by defendants' motion in limine. R. 736-55. The district court denied the
motion. R. 830-35. District courts enjoy broad discretion in determining whether expert
testimony should be admitted. An abuse of that discretion will only be found if no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district court. T-Mobile USA, Inc.
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 2011 UT 28, f l l , 254 P.3d 752.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
There are no such determinative statutes.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 20, 2002, UDOT initiated this action to condemn a .048-acre strip
along the side and front of the defendants' property. R 1-12. Defendants answered and
alleged that they were entitled to severance damages for the impact of the condemnation
on the remaining property. R. 25. On March 14, 2003, UDOT filed a motion in limine
asking the district court to preclude the defendants from introducing evidence at trial of
certain alleged severance damages, including damages for alleged loss of the right to view
and visibility. R. 42-67. On May 30, 2003, the district court granted UDOT's motion. R.
150-61.
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Defendants' first effort to appeal the district court's ruling was dismissed without
prejudice on May 14, 2004 by the Utah Court of Appeals. The appeal was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction because the challenged ruling was not eligible for certification as a
final order pursuant to Utah R Civ. P. Rule 54(b). R.'220-223.
The parties then stipulated as to all other issues in the action and afinaljudgment
was entered on March 1, 2005. R. 238-51. Defendants received $104,500 for the
condemned .048 acres of property and for damages to the remaining property. R. 239 at
1(4; R. 244. The stipulation and judgment expressly preserved the defendants' right to
appeal the district court's ruling on UDOT's motion in limine. R. 240, 244. The
stipulation resolved all relevant severance damage issues except for any loss of view or
visibility that the defendants might have suffered. All other damages for diminutions in
fair market value of the remaining property had been settled and the stipulated damages
paid to defendants by UDOT.
On certiorari, this Court ruled that there was no protectable property interest in
visibility, but that an easement for view could be damaged by construction beyond the
boundaries of the landowners' property if the use of the condemned portion of the
property was essential to the completion of the project as a whole. Ivers v. UDOT, 2007
UT 19, H1125-26, 154 P.3d 802 (Ivers I). On a second appeal, this Court emphasized that
the mandate from the first appeal was for the district court to hold a trial on the issue of

4
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whether the defendants suffered any damages from their loss of view uu. -.

]

I "s

actions. UDQT v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56. p L 218 P.3d 583 fivers ID.
< )n Marcli 3 I, -'() 10„ defendants filed a motion in limine to strike part-of the
testimony ol'UDOT's appn.usn, I Philip ("ook (R 702-..' "I In "lirii I H'X )| responded.
R. 760 62. The district court denied the motion on April 12„ M\ 10 I* 830- *5.
After a three-day trial, the jury found that defendants had failed to prove damages
for diminution of the fair market value of their remaining property caused by its loss of

; J. Defendants filed their notice of appeal on June 14, 2010. K. b/z,.
On October 4, 2010, briefing in this appeal was stayed pending this Court's
issuance of its decision in UDQT v. Admiral Beverage Corp., Case No. 20081054. That
decision was issuni mi < klubn IN 'HI I n illli whciinnj1 iK iiii'd (in llvbmafi

2.

Admiral Bev.. 2011 UT62, 275 P.3d 208.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
11le defendants have failed to address the evidence presented at the jury trial.
Indeed, no transcript lias been \nu\ ninl o( Ibc Icsliinoii^ itrnvQl mi llie first tlm nl final
R. 842-43. Defendants only reference trial evidence twice in their brief, each time
pointing to portions of Philip J. Cook's testimony attached to their brief as an addendum.
Brief c f Appellants at 5 ' & 16. ...-. ,, ; :

..-.,-...

;

,,

'
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Before this Court reached its first decision in this matter, the parties had already
settled most of the condemnation action. The parties agreed to how much UDOT was to
pay for the condemned property and "for such damages to other property as may be
recoverable under law by virtue of the acquisition as defined in the Complaint." R. 239 at
^[4. The defendants reserved the right to appeal the district court's order that held the
defendants were not entitled to damages for loss of view and visibility. The district court
entered its judgment confirming the parties'agreement.
After this Court's decisions in Ivers land Ivers II, the only damage issue for the
jury to consider was the diminution of the fair market value of the defendants' property
caused by the loss of view. After this Court's decision in Admiral Beverage, defendants
are now entitled to a trial on severance damages, if any, for their loss of visibility. All
other possible damage issues had been settled by stipulation and judgment.
The defendants had already been paid for all of their severance damages with the
exception of those resulting from their loss of view or visibility. Defendants have not
challenged the settlement before this Court or the district court. The jury's verdict was
correctly limited to the severance damages, if any, caused by the defendants' loss of view.
But defendants have failed to even argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury's decision. Plaintiff agrees that this matter should be remanded to the district court
for consideration of the severance damages, if any, the defendants have suffered due to
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their loss of visibility. But defendants should not be allowed double recovery for m\
otln it severance damages that were already covered by the stipulation and judgment.
1 he |in ". in Jim dun • n peafeellv slate dial (lie measure for deciding the defendants'
damages for loss of view is.the diminution of ihe laii nurkci value nf'ihe in mantling.
property. This is the correct standard and the jury verdict should be upheld.
Wliile defendants appeal the denial of their motion in limine, they fail to meet their
burden of sho\^ inp a reasonable likelihood llial (lit verdict would have been different if ••
that portion of UDOT's appraisal report using hearsay *'< ale'tee hail kvn e\i n led
Indeed, defendants have failed to provide this Court a complete record of the trial.
Expert witnesses are permitted to rely on hearsay if it is the type of information
reasonably relied upon by cwpiTfs in Jhni parlienlai lielil of expertise. The district court; .
correctly held that the hearsay in question met this standard.
ARGUMENT
HAVE ALREADY BEEN PAID THEIR
SEVERANCE DAMAGES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THOSE
DAMAGES, IF ANY, CAUSED BY THEIR I OSS OF VISIBILITY
L

DEFENDANTS

In their first two arguments, defendants ask t f 11 s (( > 1111 "'«• re \' e rs e ; 111 c i i e • 11 i, i < I "l I K
j u r y verdict and allow them to recover the entire diminution of the fair market value of
ilien i i" i tiaiin ii ig fH'ijpi ill \" as severance damages. Brief of Appellants at 10-16.
Defendants,, however, fail to mention lli/n i

.. . ompensated for such severance

damages before this Court's first decision in this matter.
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A. Defendants Seek to Recover Again Damages They Were Already Paid
This action involves the condemnation of less than one twentieth of an acre of
land. The defendants, pursuant to their stipulation and the district court's judgment,
received $104,500 in compensation for that small parcel of land and "for such damages to
other property as may be recoverable under law by virtue of the acquisition as defined in
the Complaint." R. 239 at f4. The stipulation for judgment was filed on February 17,
2005, almost two years before this Court's decision in Ivers v. UDOT. 2007 UT 19, 154
P.3d 802. Ivers I acknowledged that only claims of loss of View and visibility remained
in this action. Ivers L 2007 UT 19 at ^[1. The compensation that the defendants received
under the stipulation included $56,250 for all severance damages other than those caused
by the alleged loss of view and visibility. Ivers L at "P n.l. While Ivers I has been
overruled in part by Admiral Beverage, 2011 UT 62, 275 P3d 208, at no time have the
defendants challenged the stipulation and judgment that predated Ivers I.
In Admiral Beverage, this Court held that severance damages to the remaining
property, caused by the condemnation of a portion thereof, should be based "on the fair
market value of [the] property before and after the taking" and should include "all factors
that impact the market value of [the] remaining property." Admiral Bev., 2011 UT 62 at
^[43. Admiral Beverage overruled that part of Ivers I that limited severance damages to
only those caused by the loss of a protected property right. Admiral Bev., 2011 UT 62 at
1131-35.
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Here, with the exception of severance damages related to the loss of view and I'ho
loss of visibility, the defendants have already been paid the amount they agreed to for
sue:'! 'Lanugos. I o lomand (Ins matter as requested by defendants would permit them-a double recovery.
In Admiral Beverage, this Court stated that it was restoring its "long-slai iding
precedent allowing recovery for all damages that are caused by a taking." Admiral Bev.
til \i > I tins Hie (aw hhkw is the same law that existed at the time the settlement ..",
.agreement was made. Plaintiff negoli a tod nith 'ho dolopdai (s in ^ o d laith and paid the -.
agreed upon amount. By entering into that settlement agreement the defendants relea^ d
their claims for any severance damages other than those related to loss of view or
visibility

.

If defendants desired to challejii'i" ilir stiiliimiil inn JIOIIJII IMU dam

_ •'

iMiincrs

I It was their duty to raise the issue in their opening brief in that appeal. Because the
defendants did not properly raise it in that opening brief, this Court would not reach that
wu<

Mate v. Jlrouti, H:»'! J' . a <S \ I, K"H n I (I uah )l>9.' i Failure to raise an issue in the

opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue. Gildea v. Guardian Iitle Co.,, 20(11! U I' 75,
*lf7 n, 1,31 P.3d 543 ("However, it is well settled that 'issues raised b> an appellant in the
I oply i it f ilia I were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not
be considered b\

• .tppelhiU-1 ouri

uling Brown v. Glover. 2000 UT 89, f23? 16

P.3d540).
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By failing to challenge the settlement agreement in their appeal that led to Ivers I.
defendants waived any claim that they should be relieved from that agreement. This
failure led this Court to issue a very limited mandate in Ivers I. The only issue that
remained was whether the defendants were entitled to severance damages for their loss of
view. If the defendants' condemned property was essential to the highway construction
project, the district court was to "award appropriate damages." Utah Dep't of Transp. v.
Ivers. 2009 UT 56, %L0, 218 P.3d 583. Given the partial overruling of Ivers I. the
defendants are now also entitled to an award of appropriate damages, if any, suffered by
their loss of visibility.
B. Defendants Failed to Marshal the Evidence That Supports the Verdict
Admiral Beverage involved an interlocutory appeal from a motion in limine
seeking to exclude from evidence particular appraisals. The appraisers stated that they
could not isolate the diminution of the remaining property's fair market value that was
caused by the loss of view and visibility. Admiral Bev„ 2011 UT 62 at ffl[4-6.
To the contrary, in this action both parties presented evidence from appraisers as to
the damages the defendants had suffered from the partial loss of view caused by the
highway project. R. 841-45,881,882. Havingheardtheevidence, the jury determined
that "defendants [had] failed to prove damages for diminution of fair market value for
loss of view." R. 864. Defendants have not claimed that their appraiser and witnesses
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were unable to testify to the loss of fair market value due to the loss of view. lnstcMil IK
defendants ignore the actual evidence presented to the jury.
Defendanls have not sought to marshal the evidence that supports the jury's .
verdict. "When challenging (Ik .fiffieieno of (he evident e ;»i aip|Mil of a JUIA verdict,
'[t]he appealing party has the heavy burden of marshaling the evidence in supp< »1 ol Hie
verdict and showing that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is
insufficieiit^ ?Tschaggenv v. MilbankIns. Co., 2QQ7 i 11 *7,131, 163 P.3d615 ,.'._..
(affirming jury verdict where appellanl tlei 11H marshal Hie t .'idena' a;

;

- not provide

trial transcript).
Defendants acknowledge their burden (Brief of Appellants at 2) but make no
i 11 (c 1111»I (o 1111: e ( mii ,' \,'. in Tschaggeny„ defendants have neither "marshaled the evidence
that supports the jury's verdict, run1 luvo iliev provided loinsnipls of'lhe efifin in ;

.e

record does not contain a transcript of the first day of the trial. Without a complete
record, the defendants cannot substantiate their claim ofjury error. This Court should
affirn i
II. THE JURY WAS CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED TO AWARD
DEFENDANTS AS SEVERANCE DAMAGES ANY DIMINUTION IN
THE REMAINING PROPERTY'S FAIR MARKET VALUE THAT
WAS CAUSED BY THEIR PARTIAL LOSS OF VIEW
I Vf endanl »- h,t\ e (ailed u»show that the jury instructions did not, as a whole, fairly'
instruct the jury. Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency. J9W l I'll m, ||)<\ *,i'/ ' P.2d 474
(if the instructions as a whole fairly instruct the jury, i( is i <>i <-\ *T,s:iHe e r r o r il oite
11
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instruction, standing alone, is not as accurate as it might have been). Instead, the
defendants complain that, following this Court's mandate, the jury instructions were
limited to what severance damages were caused by the defendants' partial loss of view.
Defendants cite to an appraiser's testimony in Admiral Beverage that he was
unable to isolate and identify separate values for loss of view and visibility. Brief of
Appellants at 15, n.2. But defendants do not cite to the record where appraisers and
others testified to the diminution of the fair market value cause by the loss of view in this
action.1 The jury heard testimony as to the amount, if any, that the partial loss of view
diminished the remaining property's fair market value. Defendants have failed to
marshal or cite to the trial evidence in this action from appraisers for both the plaintiff
and defendants who testified as to what the defendants severance damages were for their
partial loss of view. Indeed, the defendants have failed to provide a complete record that
includes allthe testimony of all of the witnesses.
Nor were the jury instructions contrary to this Court's decision in Admiral
Beverage. The jury was instructed that the defendants had been previously compensated
for the fair market value of the taken property other than the loss of view. R. 863,
Instruction 48. They were repeatedly instructed that they should award the defendants for
any diminution of the fair market value of the remaining property caused by the loss of

1

R. 881 at 55; R. 882. Defendants have not provided a transcript of the testimony
received on the first day of trial.
12
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view. R. 859-92, Instructions 33-43. The unique circumstances presented by this action
distinguishes it from Admiral Beverage. Defendants have already been compensated for
all diminution of fair market value on their remaining property through the stipulation and
judgment entered by the parties before Ivers I. What defendants ask this Court to order is
to strike their settlement agreement without ever mentioning it to the Court. To do so
would provide defendants double recovery and to free them from an agreement that they
have not even challenged.
Defendants have failed to meet their burden to show that the jury instructions,
taken as a whole, did not fairly instruct the jury. The jury verdict was the result not of
improper instructions, but of the evidence that was presented to the jury.
III. DEFENDANTS FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN TO
SHOW A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF A DIFFERENT
VERDICT IF DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE HAD BEEN
GRANTED
Defendants appeal the denial of their motion in limine. The motion sought to
exclude from evidence that portion of J. Philip Cook's appraisal that used hearsay
evidence. District courts enjoy broad discretion in determining whether expert testimony
should be admitted. An abuse of that discretion will only be found if no reasonable
person would take the view adopted by the district court. T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n. 2011 UT 28. | 4 L 254 P.3d 752.
Further, defendants had the burden to show not only that the district court abused
its discretion, but that there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict would have
13
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been different if the district court had not abused its discretion. Steffensen v. Smith's
Mgmt. Corp.. 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993). This showing is made when, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, there is a reasonable
likelihood that a different result would have followed. Redevelop. Agency of Salt Lake
City v. Tanner. 740 P.2d 1296. 1304 (Utah 19871
Defendants have not even attempted to make this necessary showing. They have
not marshaled the evidence that was before the jury. Defendants have failed to show the
reasonable likelihood of a different result if portions of the appraisal report had been
stricken. Erroneous admission of evidence is harmless if its exclusion Would not have
resulted in a different verdict. Gaw v. Dept. of Transp.. 798 P.2d 1130,1134 (Utah App.
1990).
Because defendants failed to meet this burden, this Court should not consider
defendants challenge to Cook's appraisal report.
IV. EXPERTS CAN RELY ON HEARSAY TESTIMONY WHEN IT
IS OF A TYPE REASONABLY RELIED UPON IN THE WITNESS'S
FIELD OF EXPERTISE
Defendants claim that inadmissible hearsay cannot be used by experts in reaching
conclusions and forming their opinions. Brief of Appellants at 16-24. They asked the
district court to strike that part of UDOT's appraisal report that presented hearsay
evidence (information gathered from individuals involved with the comparable properties
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that were used in the appraisal) that confirmed the conclusions that the appraiser had
reached. R. 816 at 51-54.
In claiming that such hearsay is comprehensively banned, defendants rely on
Edwards v. Didericksen. 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1979). But Edwards acknowledged that
experts can rely on hearsay in forming their opinions. "We recognize that expert
evidence is sometimes justifiably based in part on evidence obtained outside the
courtroom . . . [b]ut such evidence is usually the type that an expert relies upon as a
matter of course in forming opinions and is sufficiently reliable to warrant an opinion
based thereon." Id. at 1332 n.2.
In rejecting a challenge to a doctor's testimony because it was based on
inadmissible hearsay, this Court held that "[t]his contention has no merit. Facts or data
used by a properly qualified expert in forming an opinion need not be in evidence if they
are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the witness's field of expertise." Barsonv.
E.R. Squibb & Sons. Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 839 (Utah 1984) (footnote and citations
omitted).
This Court also approved the use of otherwise inadmissible hearsay by an appraiser
in a condemnation proceeding in State v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 366 P.2d 76 (Utah
1966).
But a great deal of information must of necessity be acquired from others.
In fact practically all of the knowledge of which anyone is possessed,
including such vital information as his own name, age, and parentage,
comes from sources which, in the broad connotation of the term, might be
15
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called hearsay. This is also true of the accumulated learning of mankind,
which has sufficient credibility that the conduct of our daily lives and the
foundations of our civilization and culture rest upon it.
Any judgment as to the value of the property in question must be
based on values of similar land in the locality, which in turn must be related
to sales thereof. It would completely frustrate the use of expert witnesses if
they were obliged to have been a party to each transaction or to have
undergone all of the experiences and experiments which provide the
knowledge upon which their opinions were based. The witness must have
learned the constituent facts through the usual and various sources of
information. The fact that Mr. Baum is an expert who devotes his time to
that business is sufficient assurance that the information would not be
distorted or misused. If he did so, the frailty would be subject to exposure
on cross-examination. But the important point is that his opinion depends
not only upon his personal credentials, but largely upon the manner in
which it was arrived at.
14,12 Utah 2d at 319-20.
In making their general claim that hearsay cannot be used by an expert, defendants
have not addressed the district court's actual holding. The district court relied upon this
Court's opinion in Patev v. Lainhart 1999 UT 31, p O , 977 P.2d 1193 (permitting doctor
testifying as an expert to rely on hearsay information obtained from other medical
professionals) for the proposition that experts can rely on hearsay so long as it is the type
reasonably relied upon by experts in their particular field. R. 832. The district court
expressly held that market participant interviews, such as those at issue, are "an
acceptable method in the field of real estate appraisal." Id In reaching this decision, the
district court relied, in part, on two texts on real estate appraisal. R. 832-33.
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The actual holding of the district court was that the market participant interviews
used by UDOT's appraiser were the type of information reasonably relied on by real
estate appraisers. The district court did not abuse its broad discretion. Defendants have
failed to even argue that real estate appraisers do not use such hearsay, let alone that no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district court. T-Mobile USA, Inc.
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 2011 UT 28.141. 254 P.3d 752.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons presented above, plaintiff urges this Court to affirm the jury verdict
as to severance damages for loss of view. Plaintiff agrees that this matter should be
remanded for the district court to determine what severance damages, if any, defendants
have suffered for loss of visibility.
DATED this 3,0

day of July, 2012.

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff
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This matter is before the Court on the defendants' motion in limine and motion to strike
portions of J. Philip Cook's appraisal report. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding
papers, as well as, their supporting documentation. Having considered all of the arguments,
determined that a hearing is unnecessary for its ruling and order, being fully advised in the
premises, and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court DENIES the defendants' motion.
RULING
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence sets forth the basis upon which expert testimony
may be admitted. See Utah R. Evid. 702(a) ("[I]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."). Pursuant to Rule 702:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the
basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or
methods underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i)
are reliable, (ii) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been
reliably applied to the facts of the case."
Utah R. Evid. 702(b). Moreover, "the threshold showing ... is satisfied if the principles or
methods on which such knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the
manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert
community." Utah R. Evid. 702(c). "When determining whether to allow expert testimony, the
trial court must consider if there is a sufficient foundation for the expert's opinion. The trial court
is allowed considerable latitude of discretion in the admissibility of expert testimony, and in the
absence of a clear showing of abuse, [appellate courts] will not reverse." Young v. Fire Ins.
Exch, 2008 UT App 114, f21, 182 P.3d 911 (Internal quotations omitted); see also Lamb v.
Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 1974).
Here, the defendants have argued that portions of J. Philip Cook's appraisal report should
be stricken as unreliable and lacking adequate foundation. Specifically, the defendants argue that
Mr. Cook's appraisal report relies upon inadmissible hearsay of lay persons, which is irrelevant
and not of the type that an appraiser reasonably relies upon when forming an expert opinion.
Additionally, the defendants assert that Mr. Cook's appraisal report fails to disclose the
underlying methodology that he used to form his expert opinion.
With regard to an expert's reliance upon statements of lay witnesses, Rule 703 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence states:
"The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence."
2
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Utah R. Evid. 703. Further, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed the expanding scope of Rule
703, holding that:
"The traditional rule has limited an expert's opinion testimony to personal
experience and observation. ... More recently, [Rule] 703 has broadened
the basis for an expert'& testimony by specifying that facts or data used in
forming an opinion or inference need not be admissible if of the type
reasonably relied on by experts in the witness' field of expertise. ...
[Accordingly,] once the expert is qualified by the court, the witness may
base his opinion on reports, writings or observations not in evidence which
were made or complied by others, so long as they are of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in that particular field. The opposing party may
challenge the suitability or reliability of such materials on crossexamination, but such challenge goes to the weight to be given the
testimony, not to its admissibility "
Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, f 30, 977 P.2d 1193 (quoting State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 72526 (Utah 1982)) (Emphasis added).
Iii the instant matter, Mr. Cook's appraisal report indicates that he interviewed several
market participants, i.e. certain managers of various neighboring businesses and similar fast food
restaurants, regarding the effects that a loss of view would have on their businesses. See J. Philip
Cook Appraisal Report, pg. 51-54. Mr. Cook then incorporated the information he obtained from
these market participant interviews in conjunction with data research and case studies to
establish his expert opinion on the value of the loss of view from the defendants' property. See
Id. at pg. 54-55. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Cook's market participant interviews were
not the sole basis for his expert opinion. Further, the use of market participant interviews by real
estate appraisers to aid in the formation of their opinion as to a property's value is an acceptable
method in the field of real estate appraisal. C.f Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate,
pg. 272 (13 ed. 2008) (discussing the use of market participant interviews for the appraisal of
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special-purpose buildings);1 see also Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate, pg. 271
(12 ed. 2001) (discussing the market participants in the context of market definition and
delineation).
Given that real estate appraisers use market participant interviews when determining
property values, and that the scope of Rule 703 is expanding to permit expert testimony based
upon observations not in evidence which were made by others, and because the subject
interviews in this matter were not the sole basis of Mr. Cook's expert opinion, the Court finds
that Mr. Cook's appraisal report is proper under Rules 702 and 703 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. Moreover, Mr. Cook's appraisal report discusses his qualifications to provide an
expert opinion in this matter, which the defendants have not challenged, and addresses the data,
analysis arid basis for formation of an opinion as to the value of the subject property's "before
condition" and "after condition." See generally, J. Philip Cook Appraisal Report. Mr. Cook also
sufficiently identifies the market participants that were interviewed for his appraisal report, why
these market participants were chosen for interview, and the information that was obtained from
the interviews and how this information was implemented into the formation of his expert
opinion. See generally Id. The Court, therefore, finds that sufficient foundation exists for the
expert opinion rendered in Mr. Cook's appraisal report. In this matter, the defendants' challenges
to Mr. Cook's appraisal report are more appropriately the subject of cross-examination and
rebuttal expert opinion, rather than the instant motion in limine and motion to strike. C.f

1

The Court notes that while its specific citation to The Appraisal of Real Estate Thirteenth Edition discusses the use
of market participant interviews in the appraisal of "special-purpose" buildings, the concept of using such interviews
to aid in the determination of property values is, nevertheless, sufficiently analogous to the issues presented in the
instant matter to draw an inference that market participant interviews are a method reasonably relied upon by experts
in the field of real estate appraisal.
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Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, f30, 977 P.2d 1193. Accordingly, the Court must DENY the defendants'
motion in limine and motion to strike portion of J. Philip Cook's appraisal report.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants' motion in
limine and motion to strike portions of J. Philip Cook's appraisal report is DENIED.
Datesigned:_
DISTRICrCOURT
MICHAEL G. ALL
affc*««\\

•V, ^xvwcc*1'
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I sent, via email and the U.S. Postal Service, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE AND
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF J. PHILIP COOK'S APPRAISAL REPORT
u

postage pre-paid, to the following on this date:

j

teKO

Donald J. Winder
John W.Holt
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
jholt@winderfirm.com
Randy S. Hunter
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
160 East 300 South, 5th floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
randvhunterffiutah. gov
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 020700665

JAMES TVERS; KATHERTNE G. HAVAS;
and P AND F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant),

Judge Michael G. Allphin

Defendants.

WE, THE JURY IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED ACTION:
Find in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, and assess

L

damages for diminution of fair market value for loss of view in the sum of $

__.

OR
2.

/\

Find in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants in that the

defendants have failed to prove damages for diminution of fair market value for loss of view and
we decline to award the defendants a monetary sum.
DATED this \f)

day of April, 2010.

FOREPERSON
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RANDY S. HUNTER (#9084)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666)
Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801) 366-0353 '
randvhunter@utah. gov

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF'
TRANSPORTATION,
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G. HAVAS;
P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant); and
ZIONS CREDIT CORPORATION,

Civil No. 020700665
Judge Michael Allphin

Defendants.

This matter came on for trial on April 13,14 and 15, 2010, before the Honorable Michael
Allphin of this Court. Plaintiff was represented by Randy S. Hunter, Assistant Attorney General,
and Defendants were represented by Donald Winder and John Holt. A jury of eight persons was
regularly impaneled and sworn to try said action. Witnesses on behalf of both parties were sworn
and testified. After hearing the evidence, arguments of counsel and the instructions of the Court,
the juiy retired to consider their verdict, taking with them the exhibits which had been offered
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and received and the written instructions of the Court, Th^ jury subsequently returned to the
Court and, through its foreman, said that they find a verdict for the Plaintiff and against the
Defendants as follows:

.

[We] find in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants in
that the Defendants have failed to prove damages for diminuation
of fair market value for loss of view and we decline to award the
Defendants a monetary sum.
TOTALAWARD

$0.00'

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the premise aforesaid, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that James Ivers and P and F Food Services,
Defendants herein, recover from the State of Utah, no further monies; a stipulation and award of
$104,500 having been stipulated to and ordered on the 6th day of June, 2003, leaving a balance of
$0.00 owed by the State of Utah by Defendants.
DATED this / f * d a y of

/r^A^i^^,
N/

2010.
BY THE COURT:

MCHAELALLPHIN/
District Court judge
Approved as to Form:

DONALD WINDER
JOHRHOLT
AttotaiW for Defendants
Judgment on Verdict
Davis County Civil No. 020700665
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT ON
VERDICT was mailed, postage prepaid, this J2/$f

day of April, 2010, to:

Donald J. Winder
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
P.O.Box2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
John W.Holt
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668

'

7s/Stacey K. Calvin
Secretary

Judgment on Verdict
Davis County Civil No. 020700665
Page 3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

